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WRONGFUL LIFE: A MODERN CLAIM WHICH CONFORMS
TO THE TRADITIONAL TORT FRAMEWORK
From the time that man first developed a code of law, the destruc-
tion of another human's life has been considered the preeminent
legal and moral wrong. Paradoxically, recent tort cases, notably
those concerned with medical malpractice, have raised the legal
question whether one can be liable for wrongfully allowing an infant
to be born, or phrased differently, whether there is a recognizable
tort action for "wrongful life."
The term "wrongful life" denotes a claim by or on behalf of an
infant that a defendant's negligence has wrongfully led to the in-
fant's existence.' Claims for wrongful life may be of several kinds.
One such claim may be brought by an illegitimate child either
against his father for his wrongful conduct in causing the plaintiffs
conception or, if the mother is incompetent, against the mother's
legal guardian for negligently permitting the access by the father
which resulted in conception.2 Another type of wrongful life claim
is a malpractice action against a doctor for negligently allowing a
legitimate child to be born with serious physical or mental defects.3
In the latter situation, the typical allegation is that the physician,
contrary to standard medical conduct, failed to inform the parents
of the possibility that the child may be afflicted with birth defects.4
Had the parents been informed properly of the risk of fetal deform-
ity, the claim continues, they would have chosen to abort the fetus;
thus, but for the doctor's negligence, the child would not have been
born and thereby forced to suffer an abnormal existence.'
Courts generally have disfavored suits which allege that the plain-
tiff's very existence is wrongful. Several factors have contributed to
1. See Note, Wrongful Birth and Emotional Distress Damages: A Suggested Approach, 38
U. Prrr. L. REv. 550, 552-53 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Wrongful Birth]; 41 ALB. L. REv.
162 (1977).
2. See, e.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 945 (1964); Williams v. State, 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1965) (guardian
ad litem of illegitimate child brings suit against state for allowing an incompetent resident
of state mental institution to be assaulted sexually resulting in illegitimate birth).
3. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Park v. Chessin, 88
Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1976), modified and aff'd, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d
110 (1977).
4. For an example of a typical malpractice wrongful life claim, see Karlsons v. Guerinot,
57 App. Div. 2d 73, 994 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977).
5. Id.
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this unfavorable response.' Because the harm to be vindicated is the
birth itself, rather than the plaintiff's impaired condition, the courts
frequently have denied recovery on the grounds that the damages
are immeasurable.7 In addition, courts have have stated in malprac-
tice cases that, because the physician was not the cause of either the
infant's conception or his defect, he cannot be held liable to the
child because the necessary element of proximate cause is absent.
Other reasons for rejecting wrongful life claims include the lack of
precedent, the fear of increased and potentially fraudulent litiga-
tion, the desire to prevent the expansion of medical malpractice
liability, and a public policy discouraging abortions.
Although this Note will discuss the wrongful life claims of illegiti-
mate children, it will focus on the more controversial medical mal-
practice claims. Contrary to the "strict" definition of "wrongful
life," which includes only those suits brought by or on behalf of the
infant, the term "wrongful life" will be used to describe any claim
for damages, whether brought on behalf of the child or his parents,
which requires a comparison of the value of life in a disabled condi-
tion with the value of nonexistence.' By examining the claims made
6. To date, no appellate court has sustained recovery for damages to an infant born under
adverse circumstances when the only alternative for the child was not to be born at all. In
Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1976), modified and affl'd, 60 App. Div.
2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), however, the Supreme Court of New York did hold that an
action for wrongful life existed. See notes 48-61 infra & accompanying text.
7. See notes 9-38 infra & accompanying text.
8. Most modern courts and authors use this more flexible definition and include parental
claims under the rubric "wrongful life." A distinction, however, should be made between
"wrongful life" and "wrongful birth" claims. Wrongful life claims generally are brought by
or on behalf of the infant to recover for life in an impaired condition. The assertion is that
the plaintiff's birth is the cause of his injury-that his very life is wrongful-and that nonex-
istence is preferable to his being alive. Because the qualitative difference in value between
life with deformities and nonexistence is abstract, the damages sought are extremely difficult
to measure. In contrast, "wrongful birth" is generally a separate cause of action stated by
parents suing to recover for an unwanted pregnancy. Such claims usually are brought after
the failure of a sterilization operation, see, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59
Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. App. 1970), or negligent
filling of a birth control prescription, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d
511 (1971). The damages sought in wrongful birth cases usually are the medical expenses and
cost of rearing the child, economic damages capable of relatively precise measurement. The
difference in ability to measure damages, combined with easier proof of proximate cause, may
explain why wrongful birth claims have met with greater success than wrongful life actions.
See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. 1974); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240,
187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
An interesting wrongful birth claim also has been made, albeit unsuccessfully, against
physicians by the siblings of children born after an unsuccessful vasectomy. In two separate
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in the leading wrongful life cases, this Note will demonstrate that
wrongful life conforms to tort law's traditional elements of duty,
breach, proximate cause, and damages. After examining and refut-
ing the various public policy reasons urged against the judicial ac-
ceptance of wrongful life claims, this Note will recommend that
wrongful life should be given recognition as a tort.
GENERAL REJECTION OF THE WRONGFUL LIFE CLAIM
Malpractice Cases
Gleitman v. Cosgrove,' decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court
in 1967, illustrates well the unfavorable reception generally given
wrongful life claims by courts and the reasons underlying this disfa-
vor. Sandra Gleitman, upon discovering that she was two months
pregnant, informed her obstetricians that she had contracted ru-
bella during her first month of pregnancy. The doctors failed to
warn Mrs. Gleitman of the possibility that, as a result of its expo-
sure to the mother's rubella, the child could suffer birth defects.'"
The child, Jeffrey, was born with serious sight, hearing, and speech
defects. Jeffrey and his parents sued the obstetricians for their negli-
gent failure to inform Mrs. Gleitman of the enhanced possibility of
birth defects, thereby depriving the Gleitmans of the opportunity to
choose whether to procure an abortion. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal of the complaints of
cases, the complaints alleged that the physicians' negligence in performing the operations
resulted in a child's birth and thus injured the prior-born children by reducing their share of
parental love, affection, care, training, and financial support. Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d
418 (Fla. App. 1974); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1974).
9. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
10. The testimony accepted by the court was that the obstetricians assured Mrs. Gleitman
that the rubella would have no effect on the child. Id. at ____ 227 A.2d at 691.
Rubella virus infects 1 out of every 1000 pregnant women during nonepidemic years but
about 20 out of every 1000 in an epidemic. Pregnant women who contract rubella carry a 25%
risk of delivering a baby with congenital rubella. Since the fetal death rate is 10 to 15%, the
risk of fetal mortality or morbidity becomes about 40% for a pregnancy complicated by
rubella.
The frequency of congenital malformation is highest when rubella develops early in preg-
nancy: the malformation rate is 10 to 50% when maternal rubella occurs in the first month;
14 to 25% in the second month; and 6 to 17% in the third month. Cataracts, deafness, and
heart disease are the most common syndrome of infant abnormalities resulting from maternal
rubella. This syndrome was first described in 1941. Since the early 1960's, numerous other
congenital defects have been associated with pregnant women who contract rubella. Tan
MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND TnRAPY, 1010-11 (13th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
MERCK].
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both the child and the parents."
Although it acknowledged the child's "legal right to begin life
with a sound mind and body,"'" the court argued that the damages
sought by the plaintiffs were immeasurable, and acknowledged a
public policy against honoring wrongful life claims. The majority
emphasized that the defendants' conduct was not the cause of the
infant's impaired condition; once the mother contracted rubella, no
available medical treatment could have reduced the likelihood of
birth defects.' 3 Summarizing the child's claim, the court stated:
The infant plaintiff is therefore required to say not that he
should have been born without defects but that he should not
have been born at all. In the language of tort law he says: but for
the negligence of defendants, he would not have been born to
suffer with an impaired body. In other words, he claims that the
conduct of defendants prevented his mother from obtaining an
abortion which would have terminated his existence, and that his
very life is "wrongful".' 4
Even if the conduct complained of were true, the court's argu-
ment continued, no damage remedy recognized by the law was
available to compensate the plaintiffs. To compute compensatory
damages, the normal measure of damages in tort cases, the plain-
tiff's condition in the absence of the defendants' negligence must be
compared with his impaired condition resulting from the defen-
dants' negligence. Such a determination was impossible in the pres-
ent case, the court claimed, because no logical comparison could be
made between a life with defects and the "utter void of nonexist-
ence;"' 5 consequently, the court refused to entertain the infant's
complaint.'"
Mrs. Gleitman's claim for emotional injury and Mr. Gleitman's
claim for the expenses of raising Jeffrey also were held to be non-
compensable. The court found that damages could not be awarded
11. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, -, 227 A.2d 689, 694 (1967).
12. Id. at __ 227 A.2d at 692 (citing Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497,
503 (1960)). Smith established the right of an infant to sue for prenatal torts in New Jersey.
13. 49 N.J. 22, -, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967).
14. Id. See also id. at _.., 227 A.2d at 711 (Weintraub, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
15. Id. (citing Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life" 1 IsRAn L. Rnv. 513, 529
(1966)); accord, Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41
(1968), modified, 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283
N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
16. 49 N.J. at _, 227 A.2d at 692.
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when the relevant comparison was between the cost of parenthood
of a defective child and nonparenthood.' 7 Moreover, New Jersey's
public policy recognizes an inalienable right to life, and the court
stated that it could not determine "what defects should prevent an
embryo from being allowed life such that denial of the opportunity
to terminate the existence of a defective child in embryo can support
a cause of action. . . . A child need not be perfect to have a worth-
while life."'' 8 Finally, the majority stated that the right of a child to
live is greater than the parents' right to be free from emotional and
financial injury. 9
Gleitman has been cited in virtually every wrongful life case since
1967. Following the reasoning popularized in that case, most of the
courts that have denied recovery to both the infant and the parents
inevitably have based their decisions on an inability to place com-
parative values on life with deformities and nonexistence, thus mak-
ing the determination of compensatory damages impossible."0 Other
courts, while noting the immeasurability of the plaintiffs loss, also
have denied recovery because of the lack of proximate cause. In
Smith v. United States,2' a physician's negligent failure to properly
diagnose and treat rubella in a pregnant woman allegedly led to the
wrongful birth of an infant with substantial birth defects. The Fed-
eral District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that the
defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
abnormalities; even if the doctor had diagnosed the virus correctly,
there was no treatment that could have prevented the abnormalities
or lessened the likelihood of their occurrence. 2
Other reasons for denying a wrongful life claim were discussed in
17. Id. at _ 227 A.2d at 693.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, _ 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 938 (1977)
(denial of claim for wrongful life made by parents of mongoloid child against physicians for
failing to advise mother of possibility of birth defects when they had knowledge of mother's
advanced age, thyroid condition, and previous delivery of deformed child); Stewart v. Long
Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1968), modified, 35 App. Div. 2d 531,
313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), affl'd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972)
(denial of wrongful life claim); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d
372 (1975) (no recovery for physician's failure to inform mother of risk of birth defects result-
ing from maternal rubella).
21. 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
22. Id. at 655.
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Howard v. Lecher.2 A child suffering from Tay-Sachs disease was
born to the plaintiffs; 2 the infant died within two years. The parents
sued their obstetrician-gynecologist alleging that he negligently had
failed to follow the accepted medical practice of taking genealogical
histories and conducting routine medical tests to determine whether
the parents were carriers of Tay-Sachs or whether the fetus was
afflicted with this incurable disease. 25 The Supreme Court of New
York, Appellate Division, denied recovery for the parents' claim for
emotional distress resulting from the physician's negligence. 21 New
York law permits recovery for emotional injury only if it results from
direct injury to the plaintiff; the injury alleged to have caused the
parents' emotional distress was suffered by the child, not by the
parents. The court noted further that the limits of medical malprac-
tice liability would be extended dangerously if the parents' claim for
emotional distress were acceptedY Moreover, acknowledgment of
such claims would lead to increased litigation with an enhanced
likelihood of fraudulent claims.2 Finally, the court agreed with the
opinion in Gleitman that damages in wrongful life cases were not
ascertainable; a monetary recovery could not be based upon such
speculative damages. 29
23. 53 App. Div. 2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1976).
24. Tay-Sachs is a genetic disease characterized by early onset, progressive retardation in
development, blindness, dementia, paralysis, and death by age three or four. Persons like the
plaintiffs in Howard, descendants of Eastern European Jews, are the primary carriers of this
dreaded disease. See MERCK, supra note 10, at 1109.
25. 53 App. Div. 2d at -, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
Tay-Sachs disease can be diagnosed with precision, both pre and postnatally, and carriers
of the condition can be detected accurately. "[Elvery pregnant [Eastern European] Jewish
woman should be apprised of the risk of Tay-Sachs disease by her physician early in the
pregnancy. She and her husband should then have the opportunity to be tested if they so
desire." MERCK, supra note 10, at 1235.
26. 53 App. Div. 2d at -, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 461-62.
27. Id. at _ 386 N.Y.S.2d at 462. The majority stated that such an extension of mal-
practice liability was unwarranted and would require an exhaustive search of parents' geneal-
ogies for the physician to counsel parents on the wisdom of having a baby. Id. But a sufficient
genealogical background could be garnered simply by having the physician ask a few ques-
tions as a part of taking the mother's routine medical history. Contrary to the opinion ex-
pressed in Howard, a physician should have the duty to counsel parents on having children,
if information concerning possible congenital disease is readily accessible.
28. Id.
29. Id. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs' damages could be measured only by
comparing their alleged emotional injuries from rearing a child with a fatal disease with "the
denial to them of the intangible, unmeasurable and complex human benefits of motherhood
and fatherhood." Id. Although there may be parental benefits in raising a child with slight
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Pervading the opinions denying recovery for wrongful life is an
overriding judicial concern for the right to life. In cases decided prior
to the landmark 1973 Supreme Court decision of Roe v. Wade,"0
courts justified their denial of recovery either by adverting to the
public policy against abortion or by citing an existing statute that
made abortions a criminal offense. 31 After Roe, acknowledging that
women have the right to choose to have abortions, 2 courts resorted
to vague declarations of the sanctity of life and the "obvious" prefer-
ence of existence, no matter how wretched, over the "utter void of
nonexistence."33
This nearly unanimous refusal by the courts to allow recovery for
wrongful life has led to the incongruous result that, although recog-
nizing in dicta that the defendant has acted negligently and that his
conduct has injured the plaintiff, these same courts have held that
the inability to measure damages and a nebulous public policy fa-
voring life prohibit any recovery.34 This conflict has not gone uncriti-
cized. The dissenting opinion in Howard v. Lecher 5 argued that, if
the plaintiffs could show the essential tort elements of duty, negli-
defects, it is difficult to imagine any real benefit or joy in being the parent of an infant with
severe physical and mental handicaps doomed to die before its fourth birthday.
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, _ 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967); Stewart v. Long
Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1968), modified, 35 App. Div. 2d 531,
313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), affl'd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
32. See notes 127-31 infra & accompanying text.
33. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, - 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967).
In Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1968), modified,
35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), affl'd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332
N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972), the court expressed its belief in the sanctity of life in legalistic terms:
[Tihere is no remedy for having been born under a handicap, whether physi-
cal or psychological, when the alternative to being born in a handicapped condi-
tion is not to have been born at all. To put it another way, a plaintiff has no
remedy against a defendant whose offense is that he failed to consign the plain-
giff to oblivion. Such a cause of action is alien to our system of jurisprudence.
The rationale of our law of torts is to compensate individuals who have suf-
fered a diminution of their faculties, temporarily or permanently, as a result of
a defendant's carelessness. The gravity of a defendant's wrong is measured by
the extent to which his conduct has put the plaintiff in a handicapped position.
The ultimate wrong that can be committed is to cause another person's death.
It would be the antithesis of these principles to require the defendant hospital
to respond in damages to the infant plaintiff because it did not prevent the
infant's birth.
Id. at _ 296 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
34. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, , 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967).
35. 53 App. Div. 2d 420, _ 386 N.Y.S.2d 460, 463 (1967) (Margett, J., dissenting).
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gence, proximate cause, and damages, recovery should not be pre-
cluded merely to limit physicians' liability or because damages
could not be measured precisely." Likewise, in Gleitman v.
Cosgrove,3 Justice Jacobs criticized the majority opinion for allow-
ing a serious wrong to go unredressed. Justice Jacobs' dissent ac-
cused the court of inflexibility, calling the decision incompatible
with expanding principles of tort liability. The absolute preclusion
of damages provided no deterrent to professional irresponsibility,
reasoned Justice Jacobs, and the burden of complex damage estima-
tions should not result in the total denial of recovery.38
In summary, courts generally have refused to extend medical mal-
practice liability to cover claims for wrongful life. Although physi-
cians have failed to conform to accepted medical standards, the
legal system has shielded the medical profession from liability by
holding wrongful life claimants to rigid standards of damage mea-
surement and proof. This practice completely denies compensation
to severely injured,, innocent children and overlooks a public policy
interest in promoting professional responsibility.
Actions Brought by Illegitimate Children
Several actions for wrongful life also have been filed by illegiti-
mate children. The principal case is Zepeda v. Zepeda,5 in which
the plaintiff was the infant son of the defendant. The complaint
alleged that the defendant, who was already married, induced the
plaintiff's mother to have sexual relations with him by promising to
marry her. The plaintiff contended that the defendant injured him
by causing his birth as an adulterine bastard. The plaintiff sought
damages for deprivation of his rights to be a legitimate child, to
have a normal home, to have a legal father, and to inherit from his
father and paternal ancestors; and for being stigmatized as a bas-
tard. 0 The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed that, although the
commission of a tort was alleged, the claim must be dismissed to
36. Id. at -. , 386 N.Y.S.2d at 468-69.
37. 49 N.J. 22, , 227 A.2d 689, 703 (1967) (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at _ 227 A.2d at 703 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). The dissent further stressed that
medical expenses claimed by the parents were readily ascertainable and that emotional
distress from having a defective child was no more difficult to measure than "pain and
suffering," a standard element of tort damages. Id.
39. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
40. Id. at 246, 190 N.E.2d at 851.
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avoid the generation of an uncontrollable amount of new litigation.'
Specifically, the court stated that, because lawmaking in this area
would ha~e such sweeping social and legal effects, the policy of the
state should be proclaimed by the legislature. Recognizing the com-
plaint as one for wrongful life, the court feared that allowing such a
claim would encourage lawsuits protesting every possible disadvan-
tage at birth.4 2 Thus, the conflict between the need to compensate
the victims of wrongful conduct and the public interest in limiting
litigation and preventing fraudulent claims is present not only in
malpractice suits but also in wrongful life suits brought by illegiti-
mate children.
Similar claims by other illegitimate children consistently have
failed in the courts.43 Such denials of recovery are not beyond criti-
cism,44 but the merits of wrongful life claims by illegitimates have
been weakened in recent years by the repeal and revision of statutes
that historically have given inferior legal rights to illegitimate chil-
dren." The United States Supreme Court has further eroded the
basis of such claims by ruling that some state laws which treat
illegitimate children differently from legitimate children violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution. 6 Because health rarely is an issue in a wrongful
41. Id. at 262, 190 N.E.2d at 859.
42. Id. at 260, 190 N.E.2d at 857-58. The court stated that "the quintessence of
[plaintiff's] complaint is that he was born and that he is." Id. at 258, 190 N.E.2d at 857.
43. See Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. App. 1967); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d
295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974). See also Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1976) (healthy illegitimate child had no cause of action for wrongful life against physicians
who negligently performed abortion resulting in child's birth); Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d
481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966) (no cause of action by illegitimate child for
wrongful life against State for negligently failing to protect mother while a patient in state
mental institution from being sexually assaulted, which resulted in conception and birth of
child).
44. As in some malpractice cases, see notes 108-37 infra & accompanying text, the courts
can be criticized for acknowledging the commission of a tort in cases involving illegitimate
children but denying recovery for reasons of public policy and difficulty of damage measure-
ment.
45. See, e.g., VA. CODE §§ 64.1-5.1 to 64.1-5.2 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (repealing VA. CODE §§
64.1-5 to 64.1-6 to allow illegitimate children to inherit from their fathers because of older
statute's dubious constitutionality). See also Amuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-2611 (1976); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 29-19 (Repl. Vol. 1976); note 46 infra.
46. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (illegitimate children entitled to prove
paternity for intestate succession); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (illegitimate children
entitled to same support from father as legitimate children); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968) (illegitimate children entitled to be beneficiaries under a wrongful death statute for
the death of their mother).
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life case brought by an illegitimate child, his case lacks the tremen-
dous psychological impact of mental and physical defects that may
work to the advantage of the plaintiff in a malpractice action for
wrongful life. Therefore, although the stigma of illegitimacy may
persist, courts are unlikely to decide that an illegitimate child who
possesses both good health and full legal rights would have preferred
nonexistence.
UPHOLDING THE WRONGFUL LIFE CLAIM
Although the judicial response to wrongful life claims has been
overwhelmingly negative, one commentator recently recognized a
trend toward permitting wrongful life actions brought by parents to
recover the-financial costs resulting from a physician's negligence in
allowing an impaired child to be born.47 This trend gives the parents
an opportunity to prove the defendant's negligence and focuses on
traditional, readily ascertainable tort damges, thereby preventing a
court from denying'an otherwise warranted recovery on the grounds
that damages are speculative or immeasurable. Allowing the par-
ents to recover the financial costs resulting from wrongful life is
indeed a step toward recognition of the tort, but this remedy pro-
vides only a nominal rectification of the wrongful life claim. If this
remedy alone is granted, the core of the claim, the infant's assertion
that nonexistence is preferable to his defective state of life, is not
adjudicated.
The case of Park v. Chessin48 marks the only legal recognition of
a cause of action for wrongful life brought on behalf of an infant.
The Parks had given birth to a baby who survived for only five hours
before dying from polycistic kidney disease,49 "a fatal hereditary
disease of such nature that there exists a substantial probability
47. Note, Torts-An Action for Wrongful Life Brought on Behalf of the Wrongfully Con-
ceived Infant, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 712, 718 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Wrongful Life
On Behalf of Wrongfully Conceived Infant]; see, e.g., Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846
(Tex. 1975). The author of the Note includes several "wrongful birth" cases in the "wrongful
life" category. The two actions are related, but the bases for the claims are totally different.
See note 8 supra.
48. 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
49. Polycistic kidney disease is an inherited kidney disorder characterized by many bilat-
eral cysts which cause a gradual deterioration of renal function. The form of the disease in
infants usually leads to early death from uremia, an accumulation in the blood of constituents
normally eliminated in the urine, thereby producing a severe toxic condition. See MERCK,
supra note 10, at 700.
[Vol. 20:125
WRONGFUL LIFE
that any future baby of the same parents will be born with it."'"
Following the death of the child, the Parks asked the defendant-
obstetricians if the disease posed any risk to a child born to them
in the future. The defendants, contrary to acknowledged medical
fact, advised the plaintiffs that the chances of having another baby
with polycistic kidney disease were "practically nil" and that the
disease was not hereditary.' Relying on the defendants' erroneous
advice, Mrs. Park became pregnant and had a daughter afflicted
with polycistic kidney disease from which the child died two and one
half years later.52
The Parks sued the defendants for medical malpractice and
sought damages for wrongful life in the name of the infant. Basing
their action on the defendants' negligent failure to "warn, advise
[and] inform" 3 the plaintiffs of the risks attending any future
pregnancy, the Parks asserted that their reliance on the defendants'
medical expertise and superior knowledge was clearly foreseeable
and that, had the plaintiffs been given accurate medical advice,
they would have decided not to have another baby. The Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of New York affirmed the Queens
County Trial Court's holding that a cause of action for wrongful life
on behalf of the child existed against the physicians for their failure
to correctly inform the child's parents of the chances of birth de-
fects.54 The court declared that "decisional law must keep pace with
expanding technological, economic, and social change." 5 Citing
New York's abolition of a statutory ban on abortion, the opinion
declared that potential parents have the right, within certain limits,
not to have a child: "This right extends to instances in which it can
be determined with reasonable medical certainty that the child
would be born deformed. The breach of this right may be said to be
tortious to the fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole
functional human being."'"




54. Id. at , 400 N.Y.S.2d at 111-12. As to the parents' personal claims against the
physicians for medical malpractice, the court held that they could recover their direct medi-
cal expenses and the husband's loss of the wife's services, but no recovery could be allowed
for Mrs. Park's mental anguish or emotional distress or loss of services. Id. at _ 400
N.Y.S.2d at 114; see text accompanying note 26 supra.
55. 60 App. Div. 2d at - 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
56. Id.
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The Park case presents the strongest factual circumstances yet
litigated to support an action for the tort of wrongful life. As the
court acknowledged, the Parks made a specific request for medical
information concerning the possibility of having another baby af-
flicted with polycistic kidney disease and received incorrect advice
upon which they relied to their detriment; the defendants' wrongful
conduct was active, not merely an instance of omission.57 Further-
more, the infant's illness was readily foreseeable in light of the affl-
iction of the Parks' previous child. Finally, the extremely limited
prognosis for those afflicted with the polycistic disease may have
affected the court's decision. At birth, the Park infant was destined
to die within four years and actually died within two and one half
years. Many other wrongful life cases have involved children who,
though suffering from severe deformities, reasonably were expected
to live much longer than the Parks' daughter. Weighing the benefits
of life against the value of nonexistence, the court might have given
little value to the child's existence because of the short time she had
to "enjoy it."58
Importantly, the Park case involved pre-conception negligence,
not the usual post-conception negligence present in wrongful life
actions. The Parks sought advice to decide whether to prevent con-
ception; they did not allege any negligence on the part of defendants
in preventing an informed decision to abort. Therefore, the contro-
versial possibility of abortion need not have been an issue. Yet the
majority looked to the liberalization of abortion laws to find a quali-
fied right not to have a child. 9 The court should have based its
57. In Park the court distinguished Howard v. Lecher, 53 App. Div. 2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d
460 (1976). In Howard the parents based their claim on what defendants should have done,
notwithstanding parental failure to request genetic counselling. 60 App. Div. 2d at __, 400
N.Y.S.2d at 112-13.
58. Conversely, it could be argued that since the Park child lived such a short life, she
suffered less than those infants afflicted with defects for many years; therefore, even less
reason existed to uphold her claim for wrongful life. Based upon the courts' usual inclination
to value life at any cost, it is unlikely that a court would adhere to such reasoning.
59. This irony was pointed out in a vigorous dissent by Justice Titone. As the dissent
recognized, the majority wrongly based its decision on a changing policy toward abortion;
although the Park case dealt with the right not to conceive a child, it ignored the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See note
60 infra & accompanying text. Justice Titone made the simplistic assertion that "no right to
recover damages for having been conceived and born rather than never to have conceived or




decision directly and less controversially on the right of a married
couple to use contraceptives. 0
Park v. Chessin"1 represents a drastic departure from the tradi-
tional judicial attitude toward wrongful life claims. For the first
time, an appellate court upheld a cause of acton for wrongful life
brought on behalf of the infant. The Park decision, though appar-
ently based on a public policy that only indirectly applied to the
facts of the case, may alter the future course of wrongful life cases
by offering plaintiffs a favorable precedent. Nevertheless, a serious
problem remains: Park provides no guidance concerning the proper
measure of wrongful life damages.
ANALYSIS OF THE WRONGFUL LuFE CLAIM
Some generalizations can be made about the wrongful life claim
based on medical malpractice. The claim always involves a child
suffering from birth defects, whether physical deformity, mental
imperfection, or terminal illness. The complaint does not assert that
the defects were caused by the defendant's negligent conduct. In-
stead, the plaintiff concedes that the defects were caused by paren-
tal disease or condition and that the effect of this condition was
irreversible; the defendant could not have done anything to prevent
the occurrence of the disease. The claim is that the physician either
negligently advised the parents that a certain illness or trait would
not cause birth defects or that he negligently failed to advise the
parents of the possibility of birth defects. Finally, the assertion is
made that had the parents known of the possibility of birth defects,
they would have chosen either contraception or abortion to prevent
the child's birth.
The wrongful life claim is brought typically by or on behalf of the
child and asserts that nonexistence would be preferable to life in an
impaired state. In essence, the cause of action states that if the
defendant had not been negligent, the plaintiff would not have been
60. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1963) (right of married couples to use contracep-
tive devices is part of the constitutional right of privacy).
A recent author asserted that the court in Park could have supported its decision with an
anti-abortion stance. By holding a physician to a standard of care that requires investigation
and warning before conception, abortions are not encouraged but are prevented. Wrongful
Life on Behalf of Wrongfully Conceived Infant, supra note 47, at 721.
61. 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1976), modified and affl'd, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400
N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
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born and made to suffer; because the plaintiff was born with con-
genital defects, the defendant is liable to the child for damages.2
Associated damage claims brought by the parent often include pain
and suffering, emotional distress accompanying the birth and care
of a defective child,63 the medical and hospital costs, and the general
costs of raising and caring for a defective child. 4
The Tort Framework
The extreme youth of the plaintiff and the timing of the defen-
dant's conduct in a wrongful life action present no substantial ob-
stacles to bringing the action. In virtually all American jurisdictions
a child may bring a tort action to recover damages for negligently
inflicted prenatal injuries, if that child is born alive.65 Courts have
had difficulty, however, in determining whether a claim for wrong-
ful life conforms to the theories underlying tort recovery for negli-
gence generally. An examination of the previously identified general
characteristics of wrongful life reveals that these claims satisfy the
traditional tort elements of duty, breach, proximate cause, misfeas-
ance, nonfeasance, and damages.
Duty
Unless a duty exists, there can be neither a breach nor liability;
a duty is a legally recognized obligation to .conform to a specific
standard of conduct toward another. A physician is under a duty
to provide his patients with professional medical care.67
Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowl-
edge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a
62. A specific example of a child's wrongful life claim can be found in Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). The infant alleged that, as a result
of the defendants' negligence, she was "not aborted" and "was allowed to be born to a
wrongful life; that she was born disabled, retarded and crippled; and that her ability to enjoy
life had been permanently impaired." Id. at _ 233 N.W.2d at 374.
63. See, e.g., Howard v. Lecher, 53 App. Div. 2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1976).
64. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (recovery of expenses reasona-
bly necessary for care and treatment of physically impaired child).
65. Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1222, 1228-30 (1971).
Viability of the fetus at the time of the infliction of the injury is no longer a requirement
for maintaining prenatal injury actions and recovering damages. See also W. PROSSER, LAW
OF Toirrs 337 (4th ed. 1971).
66. See PROSSER, supra note 65, at 324.
67. Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, _ 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113 (1977); Karlsons v.
Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, _ 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 936 (1977).
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profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge
normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in
good standing in similar communities."8
In wrongful life claims, this standard requires physicians to be
aware of current, normative medical information and to use such
knowledge in their practice. Thus, if physicians in certain communi-
ties normally would know that a particular parental disease or con-
dition would increase the likelihood of birth defects, a physician in
a similar community should be held to possess that knowledge.
For wrongful life to be recognized as a tort, the doctor must have
a duty to impart his knoweldge concerning the possibility of birth
defects to the aggrieved party. This duty should be based upon the
requirement of informed consent in medical treatment,69 which im-
poses upon physicians a duty to disclose any facts "which are neces-
sary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the
proposed treatment. . ... 0 Thus, if a physician knows or should
know of a condition that increases the likelihood of fetal defects, he
is under a duty to disclose that information to the parents to permit
them to choose intelligently whether to conceive a child or, in other
instances, whether to abort a possibly impaired fetus.7 1 Because the
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 229A (1965). See also Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 420
(1971).
69. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustes, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d
170 (1957).
70. Id. at , 317 P.2d at 181. This duty is limited generally to those disclosures which a
reasonable physician would make under the same or similar circumstances. See Natanson v.
Kline, 186 Kan. 393, _, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960).
The rationale that underlies the doctrine of informed consent is a combination of a patient's
right to be informed reasonably of all possibilities, including risks and alternatives, which
may affect his agreement to a proposed treatment and a physician's duty to inform his patient
in a medically sound fashion. See Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 1250 (1976) for a survey of cases dealing
with informed consent in treatment during pregnancy and childbirth. See also Wale v.
Barnes, 261 So. 2d 201 (Fla. App. 1972); Charley v. Cameron, 215 Kan. 750, 528 P.2d 1205
(1974); Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1962); Young v. Group Health
Coop., 85 Wash. 2d 332, 534 P.2d 1349 (1975); Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash. App. 230, 523 P.2d
211 (1974).
71. See Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (physician has duty to make
reasonable disclosure of diagnosis of maternal disease and subsequent risks of pregnancy).
But see Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, _ 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967) (informed consent
does not include duty on part of doctor to inform mother of possibility of birth defects
resulting from rubella so that patient could have an abortion).
Even in Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1968),
modified, 35 App. Div. 2d 53, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), affl'd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616,
332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972), a case denying a cause of action for wrongful life, the New York
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mother is the physician's patient, the doctor clearly has a duty to
inform the woman of the risk of bearing the child, whether the
danger involves mother or infant.12 More problematic, however, is
whether the doctor's duty to inform the parents of the possible
dangers inures to the child after birth.
The best approach to resolve this question is to focus on the
physician's duty to the child rather than on his duty to the parents.
If a physician has knowledge or should have knowledge either prior
to conception or during pregnancy that there is a possibility that a
mother will give birth to a child afflicted with congenital defects,
the doctor has a duty to disclose this danger to the mother. In this
situation, the child clearly is a foreseeable victim of damages ensu-
ing from the physician's negligent failure to inform the mother of
the dangers of having the child. 3 Thus, the duty owed by the doctor
to the child, as well as any subsequent liability, derives from the
physician's duty to the mother.14
Alternatively, the physician arguably has a direct duty to the
child. If a pregnancy is treated, the fetus is as much a patient of the
attending physician as its mother. The doctor is under a duty to
preserve the health of both mother and child and to help the parents
select the appropriate medical procedure. Although a physician's
disclosure of possible or probable birth defects does not force the
parents to prevent conception or birth, the information makes them
aware of the risk and gives them an opportunity to decide whether
life is best for the child. Without such information, there is no
reason for the parents to prevent the child's birth, and he may be
condemned to an unhealthy, painful existence. The physician owes
a duty to the child as well as to the parents; he must afford the
child, vicariously through its parents, an opportunity to be relieved
of an impaired life.75 Once the doctor has given the parents sound
Supreme Court recognized a physician's obligation to disclose to his patient serious or statisti-
cally frequent risks of a proposed procedure. The court denied recovery for wrongful life,
however, because of the inability to measure damages and the failure to show proximate
cause. Id. at _ 296 N.Y.S.2d at 43-44.
72. This duty is particularly acute in cases like Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387
N.Y.S.2d 204 (1976), modified and aff'd, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), where
the parents specifically requested such information.
73. See Tedeschi, supra note 15, at 523-24.
74. Cf. Shack v. Holland, 89 Misc. 2d 78, _ 389 N.Y.S.2d 988, 993 (1976) (liability of
physician for lack of informed consent of the mother inures to infant who suffered injury
during delivery procedure that was not explained adequately to mother).
75. In Note, Torts-Wrongful Life-No Cause of Action for Failure to Inform of Possible
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medical information concerning potential birth defects, he has met
his duty to both parent and child. If the physician fails to give the
parents reasonably obtainable information concerning the risks of
congenital defects, a conditional prospective liability s to the fetus
is created and inures to the benefit of the child in the form of a claim
for wrongful life upon birth in a defective condition.
Breach
"Negligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a
legally protected interest, the violation of a right.'"" Therefore, be-
fore liability for negligence can be imposed on the defendant, plain-
tiff must show that the defendant not only owed a duty to the
plaintiff but that there was a breach of that duty. 8 In a wrongful
life case, the plaintiffs argument is that the physician breached his
duty of care by failing to inform, or by inaccurately informing, the
parents of the possibility of birth defects, thereby preventing an
informed decision whether to have the child.7 9
The Restatement (Second) of Torts is directly applicable to the
question of breach in a wrongful life claim:
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is
subject to liability for physical harm caused by action taken by
the other in reasonable reliance upon such information, where
such harm results
Birth Defects, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 750 (1967) [hereinafter cited as No Cause of Action], an
analysis of Gleitman, the author refused to recognize this duty to the child:
However, what duty, aside from preservation of the fetal health, did the
defendant-doctors in the principal case owe? The plaintiffs would say, a duty
to give the parents the opportunity to terminate the fetal life. But the conclusion
follows that this is not a duty owning to the unborn, for the rights are solely in
the parents to demand the exercise of the duty since they are the ones who can
react to the information and thereby profit from it.
Id. at 756. This statement, though logical, defines the physician's duty too narrowly. Al-
though the communication must be made to the parents and they, not the fetus, must make
the decision, it is ultimately the fetus that suffers most from the physician's negligent failure
to inform. Simply because the fetus is incapable of deciding between life and nonexistence,
the physician should not be relieved of his duty to the fetus to inform its parents of possible
birth defects.
76. The concept "conditional prospective liability to one not yet in being" was used first
by Justice Holmes in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
77. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
78. See text accompanying note 66 for a definition of "duty."
79. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Jacobs v. Theimer,
519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
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(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put
in peril by the action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reason-
able care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated."
This section of the Restatement appears to apply to every type of
negligent action alleged in wrongful life claims to date, whether it
be the doctor's failure to diagnose a maternal disease, his failure to
inform the patient of the risk of birth defects, or his failure to inform
the patient correctly of the probability of birth defects.81
The appropriate standard for determining if a physician has
breached his duty of care owed to a patient is whether he failed to
exercise the degree of skill and care of the average qualified practi-
tioner in the same or similar community."2 Referring specifically to
the tort of wrongful life, the physician breaches his duty of care
owed to both the parents and the child if he fails to inform the
parents of the possibility of birth defects and this information nor-
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965). Comment (b) to § 311 states:
The rule stated in this section finds particular applicability where it is a part
of the actor's business or profession to give information upon which the safety
of the recipient or a third person depends. Thus it is as much a part of the
professional duty of a physician to give correct information as to the character
of the disease from which his patient is suffering, where such knowledge is
necessary to the safety of the patient or others, as it is to make a correct diagno-
sis or to prescribe the appropriate medicine.
This comment stresses the rule's applicability both to those cases in which the physician
negligently fails to diagnose, a maternal disease, see, e.g., Smith v. United States, 392 F.
Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio, 1975) (rubella), and cases in which the diagnosis is correct but advice
as to its consequences is not. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
81. In Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975), a case involving a child born with
defects caused by its mother's rubella in the first trimester, the court held that a physician
had a duty to make reasonable disclosure of a diagnosis and risk of proposed treatment and
that the doctor in that case did not comply with this degree of care in failing to diagnose
rubella and to inform the parents of the risks attending childbirth.
In the more complicated case of Howard v. Lecher, 53 App. Div. 2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460
(1976), the alleged breach was the doctor's failure to administer tests to determine whether
the parents were carriers of deadly Tay-Sachs disease. Comment (d) to RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF ToirrS § 311 (1965), states that negligence may consist of a failure to make proper
inspection or inquiry (for example, taking medically sanctioned tests to determine the pa-
tient's condition).
82. See Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968); Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 420
(1971).
WRONGFUL LIFE
mally would be ascertained and communicated according to stan-
dard medical procedure. Thus, the doctor is not required to know
of and communicate every possible chance of congenital defects; if
a physician fails to perform a test that would have revealed a defect
or mistakenly prognosticates that a disease will have no effect on a
fetus, he has breached no duty if he properly exercised his medical
judgment and did not depart from accepted medical practice.83 A
breach of duty on the part of a physician can be proven either by
expert medical testimony which shows that the applicable standard
of care was not followed or can be inferred by common knowledge
from proven facts. 4
Although the physician's negligence in wrongful life cases occurs
before birth and even prior to conception in some instances, he still
has breached a duty to the child, a foreseeable victim,85 as well as
to its parents, if his conduct falls below standard medical practice. 6
If a physician misdiagnoses a parent's condition or fails to adminis-
ter and transmit the results of a standard procedure to the parent,
a conditional prospective liability to the fetus is created. Upon the
birth of the child in a defective condition, this liability inures to the
benefit of the child as a claim for wrongful life.87
A breach of duty can be determined only in light of subsequent
events; at the time of the act, one cannot know whether the actor
has breached a duty. Moreover, for liability to be imposed, the
83. See, e.g., Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 42 N.Y.2d 818, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 396 N.Y.S.2d 647
(1977).
84. Larrabee v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 613, 616 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
85. See text accompanying notes 77-84 supra.
86. One court stated that a child has the right to be born free from prenatal injuries
foreseeably caused by a breach of duty to the child's mother. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp.,
67 Ill. 2d 348, - 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (1977). The case is significant because it allowed
an infant to maintain an action against a hospital and a physician for injuries sustained as a
result of a negligent transfusion of RH negative blood into its RH positive mother, even
though the transfusion occurred several years prior to the infant's conception. Id. at -, 367
N.E.2d at 1255-56.
87. In Shack v. Holland, 89 Misc. 2d 78, 389 N.Y.S.2d 988, 993 (1976), the court held that
a conditional prospective liability to a fetus was created when the unborn child's mother was
not informed fully of the dangers and alternatives of a delivery procedure, and such liability
attached upon the birth of the child and inured to his benefit in the form of a claim for lack
of informed consent. The child was maimed permanently during the delivery procedure.
Application of this same theory of conditional prospective liability to the child also is
correct in a wrongful life claim. The child in a wrongful life case is a foreseeable victim and
lacks the ability to give informed consent under the same rationale as the infant injured in
delivery.
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conduct must result in damage.88 Consequently, a determination
whether the defendant breached a duty owed to the plaintiff can be
made only after the damage caused by the act becomes evident, at
the time of or after the child's birth.
Proximate Cause
Tort law dictates that, although the breach of a duty may be
linked causally to the harm suffered by the plaintiff, liability is not
imposed unless the breach is a proximate cause of the harm.8 The
essential question is whether the defendant should be legally re-
sponsible for the plaintiff's injuries, or whether the law will "extend
the responsibility for the conduct to the consequences which have
in fact occurred?" 0
The doctrine of foreseeability plays a prominent role in determin-
ing proximate cause. In the landmark case ofPalsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad Co.,"1 Justice Cardozo's opinion for the majority stated
that negligence was a matter of relation between the parties based
upon the foreseeability of harm to the person actually injured. 2
American courts generally have accepted the Palsgraf position. 3
Thus, the wrongdoer should be liable only for harm done to a fore-
seeable victim of his conduct.
In wrongful life cases, the issue of foreseeability of injury to the
deformed or unhealthy child merges with the doctrine of
"conditional prospective liability," discussed previously. The
child's claim is not that the defendant caused the defects but that
the breach of duty led proximately to the infant's birth-the matur-
ing of the harm-and, therefore, the child is forced to live a life of
deformity or chronic illness that could have been avoided but for the
defendant's negligence. A physician should foresee that if he gives
a favorable prognosis concerning a patient's childbearing abilities,
or if he does not warn of possible infirmities in a baby, his patient
probably will decide to have a child. Consequently, it is foreseeable
that any negligence on the part of the physician in failing to warn
the parents of potential defects could have an adverse effect on the
88. See PROSSER, supra note 65, at 143.
89. Id. at 244.
90. Id.
91. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
92. Id. at 244, 162 N.E. at 101.
93. See PROSSER, supra note 65, at 258.
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child. Until birth, injury from the negligent act or omission remains
a possibility; therefore, the liability merely is conditional. At the
birth of an abnormal child, however, the physician's conditional
prospective liability becomes actual liability because the injury that
could have been prevented but for the physician's negligence ac-
tually has occurred. 4
A basic argument expounded by defendants in wrongful life cases
is that the maternal illness or genetic condition, not the physician's
failure to warn of potential birth defects, was the proximate cause
of the child's injury. 5 The rationale is that an intervening cause has
broken the chain of causation between the defendant's negligence
and the plaintiff's injury. This argument fails on two grounds. First,
"an intervening cause is one which comes into active operation in
producing the result, after the negligence of the defendant."' 6 If the
physician fails to warn the parents of the dangers of having a child
after a maternal illness has occurred, the illness cannot be consid-
ered an intervening cause; the doctor's negligence occurred after the
illness. Second, even in cases in which the negligence precedes the
alleged intervening cause, such as a failure to warn of likely defects
prior to conception, if the intervening cause is foreseeable, the de-
fendant does not escape liability. Therefore, if a physician, em-
ploying the normal standard of skill and care required in his profes-
sion, would have detected a genetic defect in the parents prior to
conception that could possibly lead to birth defects in a child, the
effect of this genetic malformation is a foreseeable consequence. A
doctor who negligently fails to warn of the possible danger to any
future child conceived by these patients should not be relieved of
liability to either the parents or the child.'
94. See Note, Prenatal Injuries-North Carolina Approaches the Crossroads, 1 WAKE FOR-
aT INTRA. L. Rav. 72, 81 (1965).
Whether the negligent advice comes before or after conception should not alter significantly
the plaintiff's proof of proximate cause. The timing of the negligence is insignificant because
"those persons ought to be 'foreseeable' who could be injured by an act for as long as that
act is likely to cause injury." Tedeschi, supra note 15, at 522.
95. See Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Gleitman v. Cosgrove,
49 N.J. 22, -, 227 A.2d 689, 691-92 (1967).
96. See PRossER, supra note 65, at 271.
97. See Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
98. Two "wrongful birth" cases strongly support this argument. In Custodio v. Bauer, 251
Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967), the plaintiff-parents sought recovery for medical
expenses and physical and emotional injuries resulting from the birth of a baby after the
defendants had negligently performed a sterilization operation on the mother. The defendants
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In conclusion, although a physician's negligent failure to warn of
possible birth defects is not the sole cause of suffering by a subse-
quently born deformed child, it is a proximate cause of the child's
injuries if the parents can prove that they would have chosen not
to have the child had they known of the risk. The infant suffers
directly and immensely from the breach. Moreover, the defendant's
negligence is the proximate cause of the parents' medical expenses
in having to raise a deformed child. More troublesome, however, is
the causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the
parents' emotional distress. Most courts refuse to acknowledge a
direct relationship between the two, 0 but one commentator has
argued recently that recovery for the parents' emotional anguish in
wrongful life cases could be allowed without straining the theory
underlying the doctrine of proximate cause."' 0
contended that any injury or damage suffered by the plaintiffs was not the proximate result
of any breach of their duty but the result of an intervening cause, sexual intercourse between
the plaintiffs. The California appellate court stressed that, upon showing that the defendants
breached a duty, their negligence need not be the sole cause of injury in order for the plaintiffs
to recover but must be only a proximate cause of the injury. "The general test of whether an
independent intervening act, which actively operates to produce an injury, breaks the chain
of causation is the foreseeability of that act. . . . It is difficult to conceive how the very act
the consequences of which the operation was to forestall, can be considered unforeseeable."
Id. at -, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 472 (citation omitted).
In Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971), the possibility that a woman
might become pregnant due to a pharmacist's failure to fill properly a prescription for birth
control pills was foreseeable; the court could not say that this failure was not the proximate
cause of the birth of the child. Id. at _, 187 N.W.2d at 513.
99. See, e.g., Howard v. Lecher, 53 App. Div. 2d 420,_., 386 N.Y.S.2d 460, 461-62 (1976);
notes 23-38 supra & accompanying text.
100. See Wrongful Birth, supra note 1. After reviewing the court's decision in Howard
denying recovery to the parents for their emotional distress, resulting from the defendant's
failure to discover the risks to their child of being born with Tay-Sachs disease, the author
argued that the parents' emotional injury was within the zone of foreseeable injury:
The parents' own emotional distress injuries suffered as a consequence of a
physician's negligent failure to diagnose a fatal genetic disease embody a differ-
ent concept than the witnessing of an accident involving their child, especially
when the means of preventing the Tay-Sachs fetus from being born would have
been exercised by the parents, had they been made aware of the disease's pres-
ence. The parents of a child born with genetic deformities that could have been
diagnosed are much more victims of the alleged negligence than they are by-
standers; breach of a physician's duty to diagnose, if shown, affects them as
parties injured by the breach itself, and not merely as witnesses.
Id. at 555; accord, No Cause of Action, supra note 75, at 756.
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Misfeasance-Nonfeasance
The wrongful life claim often is based upon the physician's negli-
gent failure to inform the parents of possible birth defects. Occa-
sionally, the allegation is made that the doctor failed to diagnose a
maternal disease or administer a medical test which would have
indicated whether birth defects were probable. Thus, the negligence
alleged in wrongful life cases frequently is omission or passive inac-
tion.
Traditionally, the courts have given widespread protection to vic-
tims of active misconduct, or misfeasance, but have been reluctant
to recognize liability for a failure to act, or nonfeasance.' ° In recent
years, however, public policy has led courts to impose liability upon
a limited group of relations involving a duty of affirmative action. 102
Thus, as Prosser states, liability for misfeasance "extends to any.
person to whom harm may reasonably be anticipated as a result of
the defendant's conduct, or perhaps even beyond," but for liability
to be imposed for nonfeasance, "it is necessary to find some definite
relation between the parties, of such a character that social policy
justifies the imposition of a duty to act."'0 3 The relationship between
physician and patient justifies such a duty. Social policy demands
that a physician act affirmatively to preserve his patients' health
and well-being.
Whether based upon an act or an omission, the claim for wrongful
life should be upheld. Many courts have held a physician liable in
tort for a breach of a duty undertaken when he begins to treat a
patient and then neglects or abandons him.0 4 The failure to diag-
nose a readily detectable disease, to administer a standard medical
test, or to inform a pregnant woman of the risks of congenital defects
101. See PROSSER, supra note 65, at 338-39. Liability for nonfeasence originally was re-
stricted to persons involved in "public callings"-those people who undertook a duty to give
service to the public, for example, innkeepers and common carriers. Id.
102. Id. at 339.
103. Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284 (1965) states:
Negligent conduct may be either:
(a) an act which the actor as a reasonable man should recognize as involving
an unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an interest of another, or
(b) a failure to do an act which is necessary for the protection or assistance of
another and which the actor is under a duty to do.
104. See PROssER, supra note 65, at 340 (citing Thaggard v. Vafes, 218 Ala. 609, 119 So.
647 (1928); Braun v. Riel, 40 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1931); Mehigan v. Sheehan, 94 N.H. 274, 51
A.2d 632 (1947); Cochran v. Laton, 78 N.H. 562, 103 A. 658 (1918)).
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can all be considered forms of neglect. Furthermore, what appears
to be an omission actually may be affirmative misconduct. If a
physician fails to administer a prenatal test to determine congenital
defects that is mandated by standard professional conduct, he is not
failing merely to act to protect the mother and the potential child,
but actively is practicing medicine carelessly and harming his pa-
tients.0 5 Consequently, whether a doctor's negligence is character-
ized as misfeasance or nonfeasance, should have no effect on liabil-
ity in wrongful life cases.
Damages
For a claim of negligence to be complete, the plaintiff must prove
that he suffered actual injury as a result of the defendant's con-
duct.0 8 Tort damages generally are compensatory in nature. The
courts seek to measure the loss or detriment suffered by the plaintiff
and to compare the victim's present position with his position prior
to the tortfeasor's harmful conduct or the plaintiff's present position
had the defendant's conduct not occurred. 10 Proof of damages is the
primary obstacle to a successful wrongful life claim, for most wrong-
ful life claims have been dismissed because the courts have deemed
damages in such cases to be immeasurable.'
In wrongful life cases, the infant and its parents assert that dam-
ages result from allowing the infant to live and seek to compare the
child's defective life with the alternative of nonexistence. Most
courts and authors claim that such a comparison is impossible be-
cause no values can be placed on life with defects and "the utter
void of nonexistence.' 019 Therefore, it is argued, because damages
cannot be ascertained, the cause of action must fail. "'
105. As Prosser states:
The question appears to be essentially one of whether the defendant has gone
so far in what he has actually done, and has got himself into such a relation with
the plaintiff, that he has begun to affect the interests of the plaintiff adversely,
as distinguished from failing to confer a benefit upon him.
PaOSSER, supra note 65, at 340.
106. Id. at 143.
107. See C. McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES 560-62 (1st ed. 1971).
108. See notes 11-20 supra & accompanying text. See also Smith v. United States, 392 F.
Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Jacobs
v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
109. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, __, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967).
110. The rationale quoted most often for this theory is that of Tedeschi, supra note 15, at
529: "[N]o comparison is possible since were it not for the act of birth the infant would not
[Vol. 20:125
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Basing the denial of recovery upon the inability to determine
damages has been widely criticized."' A doctrine widely recognized
by the courts in granting remedies is that damages need not be
proved with mathematical certainty; difficulty in assessing dam-
ages will not prevent recovery by the injured party."' As the United
States Supreme Court has stated: "The rule which precludes the
recovery of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the certain
result of the wrong, not to those damages which are definitely attrib-
utable to the wrong and only uncertain in respect of their
amount.""' Thus, if the plaintiff in a wrongful life case can show
that the defendant negligently injured him, the uncertain amount
of such damage should not bar the plaintiffs recovery. As many
have argued, the measurement of wrongful life damages is no more
speculative than the common practice of placing a monetary value
upon pain and suffering."'
In wrongful life actions brought by the parents alone, damages
sought include the parents' pain and suffering in having a defective
child," '5 and emotional trauma."' The problem with the parents'
exist. By his cause of action, the plaintiff cuts from under himself the ground upon which he
needs to rely in order to prove his damage."
111. See Howard v. Lecher, 53 App. Div. 2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460,463-71 (1976) (Margett,
J., dissenting); Note, A Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life": [A Suggested Analysis], 55
MN. L. REv. 58 (1970) [hereinafter cited as "Wrongful Life" [A Suggested Analysis]].
112. See Whitehorse v. Briggs, 555 F.2d 283, 287 (10th Cir. 1977); Kinty v. UMW, 544 F.2d
706, 725 (4th Cir. 1976); L.C.L. Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 421 F. Supp.
1090, 1102 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
113. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931). The Court continued:
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of
the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental
principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve
the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts.
Id. at 563; accord, Compania Pelineon De Navegacion v. Texas Petroleum Co., 540 F.2d 53,
56 (2d Cir. 1976); cf. Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 CoLUM. L. REv.
1145, 1214 (1970) ("[It is hard to defend a requirement that attempts to cope with the
necessity for speculation by denying recovery altogether rather than by resorting to reasona-
ble approximation.").
114. See Wrongful Birth, supra note 1, at 559; "Wrongful Life" [A Suggested Analysis],
supra note 111, at 66.
It is conceivable that the phrasing of the child's wrongful life claim in Park v. Chessin 88
Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1976), modified and affl'd, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d
110 (1977), as one for "pain and suffering" could have affected the court's favorable decision.
By claiming damages for pain and suffering, the plaintiff expressed her damages in a tradi-
tionally accepted tort form, which gave an air of legitimacy to her claim.
115. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
116. Howard v. Lecher, 53 App. Div. 2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1976).
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claim is that if the action is based on the premise that the parents
would have prevented conception or obtained an abortion had they
been informed of possible defects, then all expenses and injuries
during the child's life logically would be included as damages. The
plaintiffs would have the defendant physician totally support their
child while they raise it. Such a result would be extremely harsh.
Although some courts and commentators have attempted to miti-
gate the parents' recovery by reducing the damages to the extent
that the parents have received a benefit from the birth, this practice
increases the speculative nature of the damages and may result in
a complete denial of recovery.'
If it is shown in a wrongful life case that damages do exist, the
difficulty in measuring those damages should not preclude recovery
by the plaintiff. The problem is finding a system to measure the
damages as reasonably as possible without resorting to sheer guess-
work. One recent critic suggested the assignment of relative values
to life itself, life with defects, and nonexistence."18 Using a flexible,
case-by-case approach which would consider the severity of each
child's defects, the author argues that establishing these values gen-
117. The "benefits rule" of the RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 920 (1939) reads: "Where the
defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property and in doing
so has conferred upon the plaintiff a special benefit to the interest which was harmed, the
value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, where this is equitable."
The rule has been applied primarily in wrongful birth cases (distinguished from wrongful
life cases in note 8 supra). In earlier cases, courts commonly held that the benefit of life, under
any conditions, outweighed any injury suffered as a result of being born. Recently, however,
the judiciary has recognized that benefits will differ from case to case because of varying
circumstances, for example, present severity of the child's illness and the prognosis. Thus,
the benefits rule should not be applied automatically to expunge damages; the trier of fact
must evaluate the benefit according to all the circumstances of each case. See, e.g., Troppi
v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, -, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517-19 (1971).
118. "Wrongful Life" [A Suggested Analysis], supra note 111, at 64-66. The author based
this scheme on the treatment by the court in Gleitman of life, defective life, and nonexistence.
Briefly, the Note gave the following values: life = a plus vilue (+), life with defects = a plus-
minus value (±), nonexistence = a minus value (-). The assumption made in this analysis,
and that made by the court in Gleitman, is that life is preferable, that life with defects has
both drawbacks and rewards, and that nonexistence is always the least desirable state.
The more severe the defects, however, the less clear it becomes that a defective life has
greater value than nonexistence. Thus, in extreme cases, the values should shift in the
following manner: life without defects = a plus value (+), nonexistence = (0), life with defects
= a minus value (-). According to this analysis, in certain situations, it would be preferable
not to exist rather than to suffer from severe mental and physical defects. In such cases, the
court should provide for a recovery that would restore the injured plaintiff to the value
accorded to nonexistence, the preferred alternative state (the level at which nonexistence is
no longer preferable to existence).
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erates a less speculative compensatory figure for wrongful life."'
Although this system provides some general direction for measuring
damages, it offers no practical guidance for assessing the reasonable
monetary award that would compensate a plaintiff for its birth in
an impaired state as opposed to not being born.
Proven wrongful injury to another should not go unredressed, no
matter how difficult damage measurement may be. Denial of recov-
ery in such instances deprives the plaintiff of his legal rights and
offers no deterrent to repetition of the tortfeasor's negligence. In-
stead of becoming mired in the difficult question of whether nonex-
istence outweighs existence, if the courts find that the defendant
has harmed the plaintiff, they should compensate the victim for the
loss arising from his defects as compared to life without the de-
fects.' 20 Factors such as the number and type of defects should be
considered. Although the defendant's negligence caused the birth
and not the defect, the defendant, aware of the certain or probable
handicap, should have given the parents the opportunity to decide
whether to prevent the birth.'2 ' Although the child claims that his
very life is wrongful, in reality the child's complaint is that he is
forced to live in a handicapped condition.
When courts analyze the parents' claims, the same reasoning can
be applied to limit recovery to those damages resulting directly from
the handicap.122 Because the core of the parents' complaint concerns
119. "Wrongful Life" [A Suggested Analysis], supra note 111, at 66.
120. Because life with defects and a normal, healthy life are both common variables to
which man can give relative values, there. is no reason why a court could not use the standard
compensatory formula of comparison and proceed to award damages for such standard tort
damages as medical expenses, lost earning capacity, and pain and suffering.
121. See Tedeschi, supra note 15, at 538.
122. This limitation was employed in Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975). The
defendant failed to diagnose the mother's rubella during pregnancy and warn her of the risks
to the potential child. After the child was born with defects, the court allowed the mother's
suit for wrongful life but held that recovery would be limited to the expenses reasonably
necessary for the special care and treatment of the child due to its physical impairment. Id.
at 850; accord, Shack v. Holland, 89 Misc. 2d 78, 389 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1976) (parents' damages
limited to those occasioned by their child's deformity-medical, hospital, and supportive
expenses); cf. Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Super. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.
1975), in which the court refused to recognize damages for "wrongful life" because of life's
precious nature; but to prevent immunity of the medical profession for improper treatment
of patients seeking to avoid pregnancy, the court would recognize a cause of action for
"wrongful pregnancy." The scope of the injury was limited, however, to the actual expenses
and difficulties attending an unexpected pregnancy; recoverable damages included pain and
suffering, cost of unsuccessful treatment, loss of comfort and consortium, and medical expen-
ses resulting from the injury.
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their child's deformity, recoverable damages should be limited to
pain and suffering, emotional trauma, and medical and other ex-
penses evolving directly from the handicap. This limitation provides
a relatively easy measurement of damages and places a ceiling on
the defendant's liability, which allows him to escape paying the
ordinary expenses accompanying the life of every child.,,
PUBLIC POLICY
If a court finds that a wrongful life claim satisfies the traditional
tort elements of duty, breach, proximate cause, and negligence,
recovery still may be refused on the basis of public policy. Courts
have based such denials on a public policy opposing abortion,1 24 the
expansion of medical malpractice liability,"25 and an influx of fraud-
ulent claims. 21
Abortion
Early wrongful life cases, such as Gleitman v. Cosgrove'2 and
Stewart v. Long Island College Hospital, 2 based denials of recovery
on "the right to life" and a public policy discouraging abortion.129
This rationale, although valid when those decisions were reached,
is no longer viable.
123. One commentator has argued that another alternative to the difficult measurement
of compensatory damages in wrongful life suits is to rely on punishment and deterrence by
imposing punitive damages on the defendant. 49 IowA L. Rzv. 1005, 1011-17 (1964). Although
the deterrent function of tort law is important, punitive damages are assessed traditionally
only if the defendant's act is characterized as malicious, evil, willful, or wanton. See PRossER,
supra note 65, at 10. "Lacking this element, there is general agreement that mere negligence
is not enough, even though it is so extreme in degree as to be characterized as gross." Id. Thus,
punitive damages would not be applicable in most, if not all, wrongful life cases. The imposi-
tion of liability for compensatory damages alone should suffice to deter' negligent conduct.
124. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689,(1967).
125. See, e.g., Howard v. Lecher, 53 App. Div. 2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1976).
126. Id.
127. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
128. 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1968), modified, 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d
502 (1970), affl'd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
129. It is important to distinguish between a therapeutic abortion-one necessary to pre-
serve the life of the mother-and an eugenic abortion-one performed to preserve the integ-
rity, well-being, and physical perfection of the human race. Thus, a wrongful life claim would
be based on the premise that had the parents been warned properly about possible birth
defects, they would have procured an eugenic abortion. The early cases were decided at a time
when eugenic abortions, and in some states even therapeutic abortions, were illegal. There-
fore, the courts did have a valid public policy reason to refuse the wrongful life claim at that
time. See notes 130-33 infra & accompanying text.
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In 1973, the Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, which protects the
individual's right of privacy from state intrusion, includes a
woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy.'30 During the
first three months of pregnancy, the decision to abort is strictly
between the patient and her physician.'3 ' According to the decision,
only in the third trimester of pregnancy can the state, "in promoting
its interest in the potentiality of human life," regulate or proscribe
abortion "except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judg-
ment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."'' This
important decision erased the illegality of abortion and declared
that a woman's fundamental right of privacy could not be infringed
by preventing her from having an abortion in the first trimester.
Therefore, the Roe decision removed the policy reason of discourag-
ing abortion as a barrier to recovery upon a wrongful life claim. 3
Expanding Malpractice Liability
Some courts have held that allowing recovery from wrongful life
would be an unwarranted expansion of malpractice liability.' 34 To
examine this rationale, the form of the action must be distinguished
from the standard of conduct. The nature of the claim is different
from other claims for prenatal injury because wrongful life is based
on the physician's negligent advice rather than his negligent action.
In the typical prenatal injury case, the doctor is alleged to have
harmed what would have been a normal existence for the child,
130. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
131. Id. at 163-64. The only difference between the first and second trimesters is that
during the latter the state, to protect the mother's health, may regulate the abortion proce-
dure in terms of qualifications and licensing of persons performing the procedure and the
facilities to the used. Abortions during the second trimester generally cannot be deemed
illegal. See id. at 164-66.
132. Id. at 164-65.
133. If a particular wrongful life claim relied on the premise that had the parents been
informed properly of potential defects they would not have conceived the child, as in Park v.
Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), a public policy supporting a right to
life could not block the claim. The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutionally protected
right to use contraceptives and choose whether to bear children. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965). Furthermore, if a state advocates family planning to the extent that it
provides funds for contraceptives as part of its welfare program, public policy cannot be said
to disfavor contraception. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, .L. 187 N.W.2d 511, 517
(1971).
134. See, e.g., Howard v. Lecher, 53 App. Div. 2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1976).
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whereas the wrongful life claim alleges that the physician harmed
the child by failing to allow it the opportunity not to exist.
Although these differences unquestionably exist, both types of
claims focus upon defects that could have been avoided had the
doctor acted prudently. In both instances, the doctor's act or omis-
sion contributed to the existence of the defect, whether directly or
indirectly. The physician's required standard of conduct has not
been expanded; nor is the physician in a wrongful life claim held to
a higher degree of care. Courts traditionally have recognized new
tort claims if a person wrongfully injures another. If a physician has
injured a child and its parents in a new way through negligent
medical conduct, the expansion of liability is justified; a refusal to
allow such a claim is an unwarranted shield for careless medical
conduct. ,35
Fraudulent Claims
Although frequently expressed by courts in wrongful life cases,
the fear of encouraging fraudulent claims by allowing a new cause
of action has little merit. It would be virtually impossible for an
infant to feign blindness, deafness, mental retardation, or other
disease symptoms. Physicians could determine the extent of the
injury and whether it coincided with the claim. Alternatively, a
competent court or jury should be able to detect false testimony as
to a doctor's failure to notify the parents of potential birth defects.
Perhaps the greatest potential for fraud lies in claims by the parents
for emotional distress. Such damages, however, are commonly
sought in modern courts; therefore, trial judges should be thor-
oughly familiar with these claims and be aware of any deceit. As the
court in Park v. Chessin'31 stated: "[T]he Judiciary can intelli-
gently sift the wheat from the chaff and .. .it has the ability to
succinctly deal with any attempted fraudulent scheme or claim and
make short shrift thereof."'37
135. The trial court in Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1976), rejected
previous denials of wrongful life claims based on this policy: "What statute or theory of law
grants preferential treatment of immunity to the medical profession?. . .This court believes
that the medical profession is not ',unreasonably burdened' if held liable in damages for the
injuries caused to those who depend upon it for their very lives." Id. at -, 387 N.Y.S.2d
at 211.
136. 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1976).




The tort of wrongful life, although generally not accepted by
American courts, fits into tort law's traditional framework of duty,
breach, proximate cause, and damages. The physician owes a duty
to provide an unborn infant with sound medical care; this includes
an obligation to inform the child's parents of likely or possible birth
defects. If the physician fails to apprise the parents of the risk of
fetal abnormalities, he has breached his duty. If the child is born
with defects and the parents can show that they legally would have
prevented the child's birth had they been informed of the chance of
deformity, the doctor's negligence should be considered a proximate
cause of the infant's injury, making the medical practitioner liable
in damages to the child and its parents. In determining whether
damages exist, factors such as the number and severity of defects,
as well as the degree of professional irresponsibility involved, are
important. Although compensatory damages may be difficult to
ascertain in wrongful life cases, if they are shown to exist, recovery
should not be denied totally. A practical approach, both in terms
of measurement and limitation, is to award traditionl tort damages
stemming solely from the defects suffered by the child rather than
balancing existence with nonexistence.
Various public policy arguments traditionally employed to defeat
the wrongful life claim have been eroded by modern judicial deci-
sions and changing social values. Each case must be considered on
its merits, with the underlying theme being that if a child is to live
a life with defects, it must be the result of an informed choice by
the parents, not because a physician's failure to supply reasonable
medical advice gave them no alternative. The doctor's duty to pre-
serve fetal health must include doing what is medically best for the
child; by failing to allow the parents to weigh the reasonable alter-
natives for their child, the physician fails in that duty and decides
the infant's destiny. Therefore, he ultimately should be responsible
for resulting injury to the child in the form of a defective life.
RICHARD E. WOLFF
tion. One common and proper function of courts is to-ieparate false from bona fide claims.
Courts should not deny access and recovery for many legitimate claims simply to avoid having
to determine that certain other claims are fraudulent.
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